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Abstract 
 The Supreme Court of the United States is the most insulated institution in the federal 
government. Scholars suggest that justices on the Court engage in strategic behavior, rather 
than sincere judicial behavior. The certiorari stage is a particular point of interest for scholars 
that believe justices engage in strategic voting. However, prior research has not included 
cases that were denied, in which strategic behavior is also evident. A logistic regression of 
individual justice votes to grant or deny certiorari in 499 cases during the 1986-1993 
Rehnquist Court terms shows that justices routinely engage in strategic behavior at the 
certiorari stage. They are responsive to both institutional and external factors when deciding 
to vote to grant or deny certiorari. 
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Introduction 
 The process of certiorari jurisdiction is one in which the proverbial needle in a 
haystack is found (Breyer 2006). Many scholars have researched the possibility of strategic 
behavior by Supreme Court justices in the certiorari stage (Shubert 1958; Brenner 1979; Krol 
and Brenner 1989; Provine 1980; Perry 1991; Epstein and Knight 1998).  Certiorari is the 
first step in the process of the Supreme Court reviewing a case and serves as a gate-keeping 
point for the justices. This stage is where each justice will decide if he or she believes that a 
case warrants full review by the Court. The shortcoming of prior research is that it does not 
include data on cases that were denied. Previous research also considers the Court as a whole 
when examining strategic behavior instead of looking at each justice as a strategic actor. I 
propose that using data on individual justices’ votes in cases that were both granted and 
denied will point to strategic behavior by individual justices in the certiorari stage and 
strengthen the findings of previous research. 
Literature Review 
Writs of Certiorari 
Rule 10  
 Unlike its outline for the other two branches of the federal government, the 
Constitution of the United States is relatively silent on the judiciary. Article III of the 
Constitution, in only two sections, provides for one Supreme Court and inferior courts that 
Congress may establish as it sees fit. Among the many conversations about federalism, a 
major question was the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Hamilton et al. 2009; Borden 
1965; Ratner 1981; Amar 1989). Article III, Section 2 limits the authority of the federal 
courts to cases concerning constitutional questions, laws of the United States, cases in which 
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the United States is a party, controversies between different states, and controversies between 
citizens of different states. The Supreme Court of the United States enjoys original 
jurisdiction over a small subset of matters1. These are the only cases that the Court must hear. 
 The cases included in the the Court’s original jurisdiction make up a very small 
number of cases that they consider. There are four other ways that a case can be heard by the 
Court: appeal as a matter of right, by a writ of certiorari, writ of certification, or by an 
extraordinary writ.  
Appeal as a matter of right occurs when the parties have a statutory right to review by 
the Supreme Court without having to obtain permission from the Court. This jurisdiction is 
found in Title 28 of the United States Code and was severely limited when §1257 was 
revised in 1988 to remove appeal by right from state court decisions, making certiorari the 
only avenue for a party to have his case reviewed by the Supreme Court (28 U.S. Code 
§1257). Chief Justice Rehnquist (1986) noted that Congress, via its passage of the Certiorari 
Act of 1925, agreed with with the Court that appeal by right was not necessary in cases 
originating from state courts because the Court had abandoned its role as an error-correcting 
court in favor of deciding broader legal questions. Instead of simply claiming that a judge 
made a mistake, cases must present questions that have political or social import.  
A writ of certification is the procedure by which a federal appeals court seeks 
guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court, and an extraordinary writ occurs when the Court 
exercises unusual or discretionary power (e.g. habeas corpus or writ of mandamus) (Garner 
and Black 2004). The most popular avenue for cases to reach the Supreme Court and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Controversies between two or more states, controversies between the United States and a 
state, and proceedings involving a citizen of one state against a citizen of another state or 
foreign aliens.	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origin of the majority of the cases heard is by a writ of certiorari, which allows for judicial 
discretion in the cases that they hear. This so-called gatekeeping power of the Court was 
granted by the Judiciary Act of 1925 (Witt 1990).  
 Guidance on a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court can be found in 
the Rules of the Supreme Court (2013). Rule 102 deals specifically with certiorari. The rule 
outlines the Court’s position that issuance of a writ of certiorari is a matter of judicial 
discretion and not a matter of right; writs will be granted only for “compelling reasons.” Rule 
10 outlines some instances that may be considered compelling reasons (e.g. conflict in the 
circuit courts or conflict between a state court and a federal court) but notes that the list isn’t 
exhaustive. Though vague as to the circumstances that would warrant approval of a petition 
for certiorari, the rule points out very explicitly that writs are “rarely granted when the 
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated 
rule of law.” Rhode and Spaeth (1976) mention that criteria for having one’s case granted 
certiorari, such as having “special and important reasons [warranting review],” are simply a 
baseline. The process of deciding which case gets heard is a process that only the justices 
themselves understand. 
Process of Certiorari 
 Perry (1991) lays out the general process that certiorari cases go through at the 
Supreme Court. If a petition meets the general guidelines, such as page-length, and number 
of copies, the petition is assigned a docket number. All of the petitions that are assigned 
docket numbers are then divided up among the justices who participate in the cert pool.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Appendix A 
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The cert pool, first proposed by Justice Lewis Powell, is composed of justices who 
review petitions for cert and may include as many justices as wish to participate. The cert 
pool allows the Court to work more efficiently in reviewing every petition that comes to the 
Court. In the 1986-1993 terms, Justice John Paul Stevens was the only justice who did not 
participate in the cert pool (Epstein et al 2007).  
The law clerks then prepare memos that contain summaries of the case facts, 
decisions below, opinions, the contentions of the petitioners and respondents, and make 
recommendations about cert. These memos are sent to the Chief Justice’s chambers and then 
distributed to the chambers of the associate justices.  
After distribution, the Chief Justice then adds cases to the discuss list. The other 
justices may add cases but cannot have cases taken off the list. The cases on the discuss list 
are discussed at the certiorari conference3 where the justices vote on whether to grant or 
deny. Following the so called “rule of four,” if a petition receives four votes to grant 
certiorari, the writ is granted and the Court will hear the case (Perry 1991). 
The number of cases that are actually granted certiorari is extremely low. Rhode and 
Spaeth found that only 10-15% of cases for which petitions for certiorari were filed were 
actually granted (1976). The high number of denials leads Perry to explain what he calls a 
“presumption against a grant.” In his interviews with clerks and justices, he found that 
justices generally look for reasons to deny certiorari. This is because there might be a general 
consensus on the Court that it is better to deny a petition because the issue presented in that 
petition will almost inevitably be raised to the Court again. Since the Supreme Court is 
concerned only with clarifying questions and not the facts of a case, it is not necessary for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A conference at which only the justices are present. 
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Court to be concerned with the case on an individual basis (Taft 1925). The facts of a case 
are already established and the decisions of the Court have implications for the rest of society 
in similar cases (Scalia 1989). The clearest denials are those petitions that only raise 
questions of fact (Perry 1991).  
 It takes only one element of a case to make it uncertworthy, but it takes many things 
to make one certworthy (Perry 1991). A petition must usually contain some level of conflict 
at the circuit court level, importance on a national scale, and must concern each individual 
justice’s particular area of interest. Even Supreme Court justices have pointed out that each 
justice screens cases differently. For example, in his 1973 address to the First Circuit Judicial 
Conference in defense of the process by which cases are granted certiorari, Justice William J. 
Brennan explained that different justices who participate in the cert pool have different 
concerns and particular interests when reviewing cases. Thus the cases that are selected from 
the thousands of petitions every year should be considered indicative of the issues that the 
Court has deemed necessary to address. Brennan also mentioned that the number of cases 
that are granted review by the Supreme Court has remained relatively constant over the past 
couple of decades. This is not caused by a set number, but because this is the number of cases 
that are “certworthy.” Justice Brennan, being of the view the the Constitution is a living 
document, also commented that the cases that find their way onto the Court’s calendar are 
illustrative of changes within American society as a whole (Brennan 1973).  
Certiorari as a Strategic Point for Justices 
 Many Supreme Court scholars have theorized that justices act strategically in the 
choices they make (e.g. Caldeira et al 1999; Epstein and Knight 1998; Brenner and Krol 
1989). Voting on whether to grant or deny certiorari is arguably the most important decision 
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a justice can make. Glendon Shubert was one of the first political scientists to look at the 
certiorari stage as a strategic point for the Court (Shubert 1958). Shubert suggested that since 
it takes four votes to hear a case, the four justices who vote for certiorari can be organized 
into a certiorari bloc. The goal of that bloc is to convince one of the other five justices to vote 
with its opinion, which Shubert found statistically was not very hard to do. According to 
Shubert, the strategy of the certiorari bloc was to never vote to grant cert in which the 
petitioner was ideologically divergent from the bloc and to vote for their preferred petitioner 
in final decision on the merits. He concluded that if the certiorari bloc followed that strategy, 
their preferred outcome would be achieved 92% of the time.  
However, Shubert used the opinions in the decision on the merits to gather 
information about strategic action at the certiorari stage, and assumed that the justices not 
voting in his so-called cert bloc had no predisposition either for or against the petitioners, 
based on the rule of four, thereby dismissing the theory of strategic voting for over half of the 
Court (Shubert 1958). The problem with Shubert’s conjecture is that he was not able to use 
actual certiorari voting data in his research. This data was not available for the Court terms 
he researched. He also disregards strategic behavior of other justices by discounting justices’ 
votes that weren’t in the cert bloc. Using certiorari voting data for each justice who cast a 
vote in the certiorari stage would be a more effective method of measuring strategic behavior 
at this stage.  
 Baum (1997) makes the case that justices act strategically; one particular point of 
strategic behavior is the case selection stage. Building on Shubert’s theory that the certiorari 
stage contains strategic behavior, Baum argues that justices might engage in what he calls 
long-term strategy, resulting in good relations with other justices that may make persuasion 
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in future cases easier. This strategy also results in establishing good relationships with the 
other branches to reduce the chance of reversal through policy-making. Long-term strategy is 
indicative of justices engaging in strategic behavior as a means of advancing their own policy 
goals. One might consider this to be similar to logrolling in Congress.  
Baum, however, posits that logrolling in Congress is a different process than strategic 
behavior in the Court. Strategic voting in the House and Senate is often sharp and distinct 
and occurs in defined stages of the policy process, such as amendment voting4. Justices, on 
the other hand, are able to act strategically at some stages of a case’s life on the Court while 
adhering to sincere behavior at other stages and are still able to achieve their desired 
outcomes.  
The long-term strategy is important for justices because it strengthens the institutional 
influence of the Court. Engaging in long-term strategy also increases the chance that a justice 
will be able to persuade other justices to join him in future decisions. Individual cases have 
short-term effects for the parties to the cases but have long-term effects on legal doctrine, so 
justices accordingly engage in long-term strategic behavior. It is also important to a justice’s 
long-term strategy to make decisions based on their predictions of possible future cases.  
 In examining the ideology of the Court as a whole as it relates to voting on certiorari, 
Krol and Brenner (1989) found that the Court employs three specific strategies: error 
correction, prediction, and majority. They proposed that the error-correcting strategy is 
employed when a justice voted to grant certiorari with the intention of voting to reverse at the 
merit stage. However, this requires the presumption that their desired outcome would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Perry (1991) also claims that logrolling does not occur. He explains that in his interviews 
with clerks and justices on the Court none of his informants mentioned the behavior and 
some even explicitly stated that it does not occur. 
	   10 
achieved in the decision on the merits, creating the need for the prediction strategy. The 
prediction strategy relies on the individual justice’s belief that he will be in the majority 
opinion at the merit stage. Using this strategy, a justice will vote to grant certiorari if he 
believes that he will be in the majority, even if the decision below is congruent with his own 
beliefs, and will vote to deny if he doesn’t think his position will prevail.  
The last strategy that appears at the certiorari stage is the majority strategy. The 
majority strategy assumes that a justice sitting on a Court with an overall ideology that is 
similar to his will be more likely to vote to grant certiorari. A justice who is in the ideological 
minority of the Court is less likely to vote to grant because there is a smaller likelihood of 
that justice winning the case. A justice who is in the ideological minority will also find it 
harder to persuade other justices to agree with his position.   
Using data collected from both conservative and liberal courts, Krol and Brenner 
found evidence of all three strategies being employed by the justices. They found also that 
liberal justices were generally more prone to vote to grant cert than their conservative 
colleagues. However, it is important to note that Krol and Brenner only used cases where 
certiorari was granted in their dataset and did not use cases that were denied review. Granted 
cases illustrate issues that the Court deems important enough to hear. Similarly, denied 
petitions point to issues that justices feel are not salient enough to warrant the Court’s 
attention or are not ripe enough for the Court to decide. Using cases that were denied review 
would offer insight on the particular reasons that justices deny cert. Assuming that justices 
only behave strategically in the certiorari stage of granted cases is a fallacy and failure to 
include cases that were denied certiorari doesn’t account for the strategic behavior that 
accompanies voting to deny a case. 
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 Perry (1991) finds that strategic behavior occurs most often within chambers rather 
than between chambers. Justices do not typically try to persuade other justices to join their 
vote to grant or deny certiorari. Rather, strategic behavior at the cert stage occurs 
independently of a justice trying to persuade other justices of voting similarly to him in the 
cert stage. Justices do not form explicit coalitions in the agenda-setting stage but that 
“coalitions are sometimes assumed based on anticipated reactions” (214). After conducting 
interviews with justices and clerks, he explained what scholars of the Supreme Court call 
defensive denials and aggressive grants. A justice engages in defensive denial when he votes 
to deny a case because he does not like the predicted outcome on the merits, even if he 
believes that the case is certworthy. Perry explains that the fear of a case being granted and 
reversed is a valid one because of the high rate of reversal (two out of three cases that are 
reviewed). An aggressive grant is a justice voting to grant cert in a case that may not be as 
certworthy because that case has characteristics that make it more likely for the justice to win 
the decision on the merits.  
This is similar to Provine’s (1980) argument that justices don’t act strategically, but 
are rather influenced by their perceived proper role of the justice. Boucher and Segal (1995), 
however, are not convinced that justices only act strategically occasionally5. They were the 
first to examine the strategic voting of justices by analyzing the behavior of the individual 
justice. Working from a presumption of reversal bias, Boucher and Segal found that the use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Perry cites Provine’s 1980 work that suggests justices aren’t acting strategically when they 
make decisions because they are controlled by the perceived role of the justice. Perry feels 
that the justices may sometimes act strategically but aren’t acting strategically the majority of 
the time. When the justices are acting strategically, they are more likely to engage in 
defensive denials (Perry 1981). Shubert also noted that justices were more likely to engage in 
defensive denials, however Shubert was only able to examine data on the final votes and 
didn’t have access to cert votes (Shubert 1958). 
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of defensive denials wasn’t a systematic part of certiorari voting on the Vinson Court (1946-
1953). However, they found that justices engaged in aggressive grants when they wanted to 
reverse the lower court’s decision. This confirms the theory of reversal bias and proves that 
justices engage in strategic behavior when voting to grant certiorari. Boucher and Segal came 
to these conclusions using the votes to grant certiorari as it relates to the justices’ final votes 
on the merits. They were able to comment only on the strategic behavior of the justices in 
those few cases that were granted. Failing to look at actual cert votes inhibits the ability to 
test actual strategic behavior at the cert stage. Using votes on the merits to measure strategy 
at the cert stage also discounts the importance of strategy in voting to deny a case.  
External Factors Affecting Certiorari 
 Under the strategic model, justices consider factors outside of the Court when they 
make decisions. Epstein and Knight explain that  
“…if the members of the Court wish to create efficacious policy, they not only must 
be attentive to institutions that govern their relations with their colleagues but also 
take account of the rules that structure their interactions with external actors” (1998, 
138-139). 
 
These external actors can include Congress, the executive branch via the Solicitor General, 
and entities that are not parties to the case but have significant interest in the outcome who 
make their concerns and positions known by way of amicus curiae briefs.  
Proposing a separation of powers model, Epstein and Knight (1998) find it 
particularly important to consider the relationships between the Court and the other branches 
of government. Justices take the wishes of Congress and the president into consideration 
when making decisions because of Congress’ ability to enact legislation that effectively voids 
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Supreme Court decisions6 and the president’s ability to decide if and how to enforce Court 
decisions7. This combined ability of the other branches to alter the Court’s decisions is one of 
three reasons justices consider the wishes of external actors before making decisions.  
Congress also has the ability to affect the justices and the Court negatively, namely 
by freezing their pay (U.S. Const. Article III, Section 1) or altering their appellate jurisdiction 
(U.S. Const. Article III, Section 2). In addition, Congress may impeach Supreme Court 
justices. Furthermore, other governmental institutions can simply refuse to follow their 
rulings (Brent 1999).  
The most notable example of this is Immigration and Naturalization Services v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), in which the Court ruled the legislative veto unconstitutional. 
Congress, however, has continued to use the legislative veto, virtually unopposed, since the 
Court’s decision in Chadha, rendering the decision ineffective and calling into question the 
efficaciousness of the decision. It is because of this that Epstein and Knight argue that the 
Court will consider the wishes of outside actors. Though they were concerned mainly with 
the final decision on the merits, it is clear from the literature that scholars find an important 
link between the decision on the merits and the decision to grant cert.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Congress has overridden several Supreme Court cases including cases involving what they 
consider to be bad interpretation of law (Public Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Belts, 492 
U.S. 158 (1989) overridden by Pub.L. No. 101-433), cases that Congress deems bad policy 
(Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1984) overridden by Clean Air Act 
Amendments), and cases that result in Congress removing Supreme Court jurisdiction 
(Finley v. U.S., 490 U.S. 545 (1989) overturned by Judicial Improvements Act of 1990). See 
William Eskridge. 1991, “Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,” The 
Yale Law Journal: 331-445. 
7 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), in which the Court deemed the Cherokee nation 
a sovereign nation outside the authority of the United States and the State of Georgia. 
Andrew Jackson is noted as saying, "Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”	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The solicitor general holds a position of particular importance in the study of judicial 
decision making. Many view him as not just a representative of the president’s administration 
but as an experienced player in the Supreme Court process who will faithfully present 
relevant issues to the Court (McGuire 1998; Bailey et al. 2005). The solicitor general is 
afforded consideration by the Supreme Court that is not granted to other actors mostly 
because the solicitor general can offer the bench legal expertise (McGuire 1998). The reason 
that the solicitor general enjoys success before the Court is because of the reliability of the 
information that is offered by him to the Court (Bailey et al. 2005). A justice is most 
receptive to the solicitor general’s influence when he files an amicus brief, when he is either 
ideologically congruent with the justice, or when the amicus brief that he files is 
ideologically divergent from his own beliefs (Bailey et al. 2005).  
An amicus curiae brief (literally “friend of the court”) is a brief that an interested 
group, whether private persons or government officials, may file to inform the Court of its 
concerns. The content of amicus briefs varies widely because the motives for filing them are 
different and depend on the case and the interested group (Bloch and Krattenmaker 1994). 
Many scholars have researched the importance of amicus curiae briefs in Supreme Court 
petitions and at the certiorari stage. Working under the assumption of Rhode and Spaeth 
(1976) that justices are ideologically motivated, Caldeira and Wright (1998) predicted that 
justices respond to amicus curiae briefs as an indicator of cases that will have the most 
political and social impact. The likelihood of cert being granted significantly increased with 
the presence of one or more amicus curiae briefs either for or against a particular party or 
outcome of the case.  
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Ennis (1983) argues that the presence of amicus briefs is perhaps the most important 
factor for a case, calling it not just the “icing on the cake” but rather “the cake itself.” He 
explained that amicus briefs are ever-increasing in petitions to the Court, noting that by the 
1980 term, over 70% of cases were accompanied by amicus curiae. Amicus briefs are 
effective in supporting the parties as the briefs allow an argument to be fleshed out in more 
detail rather than in summary form on the petition for a writ of certiorari. Amicus briefs also 
allow the Court to become informed about the implications that their decisions may have on 
public policy. The quality of amicus briefs that are filed is an important factor for justices 
considering them. Amicus briefs filed by high-profile groups that offer persuasive arguments 
that add to the litigants’ briefs are more likely to capture the attention of justices and their 
clerks (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2013). Similarly, Shubert (1960) notes that it is the actual 
role of the Supreme Court that governs the importance of amicus curiae briefs. If the Court 
was simply an error-correcting tribunal, then the only interests that matter should be those of 
the parties to the case. However, as “formulators of national policy,” Shubert argues that 
amicus briefs are necessary to inform the Court of the major public policy implications of a 
case.  
Theory 
 Prior research on decision making at the certiorari stage of the Supreme Court has 
typically been done at the aggregate level, considering the actions of the Court as a whole. 
This, however, does not explain the behavior of individual justices. Additionally, due to a 
lack of data, previous studies have only conducted analysis only on cases that were granted 
certiorari. This fails to consider the strategic behavior that justices exhibit when they vote to 
deny certiorari. If justices act strategically in the certiorari stage, they will act as strategically 
in denied cases as granted cases. If defensive denials are a regular element of judicial 
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decision making, considering the votes in denied cases are important to having a complete 
picture of strategic behavior at this stage of of the Court process (Perry 1991). Strategic 
behavior can only be accurately measured when the actions of the Court are considered at the 
individual justice level in all cases, whether granted or denied.  
 Departing from Provine’s (1980) theory that justices make decisions based on their 
perceived proper role of a justice, I expect to find that justices behave especially strategically 
in the certiorari stage, engaging in aggressive grants and, less frequently, defensive denials 
(Boucher and Segal 1995). Knowing that there is a reversal bias at work, it is a mistake to 
theorize that a justice will act sincerely even in cases that they know will be decided against 
their preferences. A strategic justice should base his cert vote on his perceived outcome on 
the merits will be. This leads to two hypotheses: 
Defensive Denial Hypothesis: A justice acts strategically when he is in the ideological 
minority and votes to deny cert. 
Aggressive Grant Hypothesis: A justice acts strategically when he is in the ideological 
majority and votes to grant cert. 
If a justice acts strategically, it is expected that he will respond to many variables when 
determining his vote to either grant or deny cert. Following the theory of reversal bias, a 
justice should be more likely to vote to grant cert if he has the intention of reversing the 
lower court’s decision. Since two out of every three cases are reversed from the lower court’s 
decision, a justice who wants to reverse a lower court decision has a reasonable expectation 
of achieving that outcome, leading to the hypothesis: 
Reversal Bias Hypothesis: A justice will vote to grant certiorari if his position is 
ideologically divergent from the lower court decision.  
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While acting strategically when considering the vote to grant or deny certiorari, a 
justice will be concerned with the perceived legitimacy of his decision. Every justice wants 
to be remembered as making effective decisions in each case. This legitimacy is derived from 
the response of the public to the outcome of the case. Mishler and Sheehan (1993) show that 
the Court responds to public opinion and final opinions in cases tend to reflect public 
opinion. Since the Court responds to public mood in their final decisions on the merits, it is 
reasonable to believe that justices will consider public mood when voting grant or deny cert, 
leading to the: 
Public Mood Hypothesis: A justice will be more likely vote to grant certiorari if his 
preferred outcome on the merits is expected to be congruent with public mood.  
The importance of a case is illustrated by the presence of amicus curiae briefs, 
especially at the cert stage. Amicus curiae briefs either for or against the granting of certiorari 
of a certain case shows that groups have an interest in the outcome of the case. Amicus curiae 
briefs that are against granting certiorari are equally significant as briefs for granting cert 
because it shows that there is at least one group expressing interest in the Court not reviewing 
the case (Caldeira and Wright 1988). Amicus curiae briefs could show a justice that a case is 
particularly certworthy. Since justices aren’t concerned with cases on an individual basis, 
amicus curiae briefs indicate a case that might have greater political or social impact. This 
leads to the: 
Amicus Curiae Hypothesis: As the number of amicus curiae briefs filed increases, so 
too should the likelihood the justice will vote to grant cert. 
An individual justice should also be responsive to the other branches of government. 
Congress has the power to pass legislation to overturn Supreme Court decisions and the 
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president has the ability to refuse to enforce a decision of the Court (Epstein and Knight 
1998). A Congressional override occurs when a statute or amendment completely overrules a 
Court decision, modifies the decision in a material way that would have made the case be 
decided differently, or modifies the consequences of the Court decision. Each Congress since 
1975 has overridden an average of 15-20 Court decisions each (Eskridge 1991). The 
president has the power to refuse to enforce decisions, order executive officials to ignore 
decisions, and can sign or veto override legislation (Owens 2010). Based on the high rate of 
reversals, Epstein and Knight’s theory necessitates the: 
Senate Hypothesis: A justice will be less likely to vote to grant certiorari if the 
median member of the Senate agrees with the lower court decision.  
House Hypothesis: A justice will be less likely to vote to grant certiorari if the median 
member of the House of Representatives agrees with the lower court decision. 
President Hypothesis: A justice will be less likely to vote to grant certiorari if the 
president agrees with the lower court decision.  
Additionally, prior research suggests the United States Solicitor General is afforded 
consideration by the Court that other entities are not. This is because the solicitor general is 
perceived by the Court to be an experienced litigator who will faithfully present issues to the 
Court. The solicitor general’s position in a case provides information to justices about the 
impact of the decisions in cases (Baily et al 2005). When the United States is a party to a 
case, the solicitor general is the government’s counsel. Therefore, it is appropriate to suggest 
the: 
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United States as a Party Hypothesis: A justice will be more likely to vote to grant 
certiorari if the United States is a party to a case because of the prior success of the 
solicitor general in the Court. 
Though the ideological direction of the Court as a whole may be classified as conservative, 
liberal, or moderate, the Court is composed of justices who each have different ideologies. 
The long-term strategy suggests that justices will make decisions that promote collegiality 
among justices (Baum 1997). If a justice can persuade the ideologically median justice to 
join his vote, he will have a better chance of being in the majority at the decision on the 
merits. Therefore, I test the: 
Median Justice Hypothesis: A justice will be more likely to vote to grant certiorari if 
he is ideologically congruent with the ideologically median justice. 
Data and Methods 
 Since the mid-1980s, the Court has received an average of 5,487 petitions for review 
every year. This includes an annual average of about 2,500 paid cases and an average of 
some 3,500 in forma pauperis (IFP) cases8. Of these petitions, an average of 115 paid cases 
were granted review annually and an average of only 19 IFP cases were granted review 
(Epstein et al 2007). It is important to measure the votes to grant or deny certiorari in cases 
that were both granted and denied. If justices behave strategically in the cert stage of granted 
cases it is reasonable to believe that they also behave strategically in the cert stage of cases 
that were denied. Though many cases are denied, it is imperative to look at the cases justices 
deemed important enough to place on the discuss list because that petition had elements that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In forma pauperis petitions have increased from an average of 2,400 in the 1970s to an 
average of 6,500 petitions in the 2000s. The number of ifp petitions increases every term 
(Epstein et al 2007). 
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made it certworthy enough for at least one justice to consider. Placing a case on the discuss 
list signals to other justices that at least one of their colleagues deemed it important enough to 
consider. I take a random sample of 499 cases that were placed on the discuss list during the 
1986 – 1993 terms of the Rehnquist Court (Black and Owens 2009). These terms were 
chosen because they are the terms that are documented in the Blackmun Archives and this is 
the span of time for which the most relevant comprehensive data is available (Epstein, Segal, 
and Spaeth 2007).  
 Justice Harry A. Blackmun kept detailed records during his time on the Rehnquist 
Court, including votes to grant or deny certiorari and the certiorari pool memos that clerks 
prepared for the petitions. Using the Blackmun Archives prepared by Epstein, Segal, and 
Spaeth (2007), I gathered vote data for every justice participating in the cert stage for every 
case in the sample. For the 13 justices who served on the court during the 1986-1993 terms, a 
total of 6,485 votes at the certiorari stage were recorded. The archives also provided 
information on whether cert was granted or denied, and the status of the case (whether paid 
or filed in forma pauperis).  
Since the parties to the cases are listed on the cert pool memo, the United States as the 
petitioner and the United States as the respondent could easily be recorded. For the purposes 
of coding the United States as a party to the case, only those entities that represent the 
government as a whole were recorded as the U.S. being a party (See Appendix B for a list of 
entities that constitute the federal government). Contained in the Supreme Court Database is 
the ideological direction of the lower court decision (Spaeth et al 2016). This variable is 
coded as either liberal or conservative. This data is only available for cases that were granted. 
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In measuring the factors outside of the Court that may affect cert decisions, data on 
the presence of amicus briefs for granted cases was gathered (Collins 2004). The database 
lists the number of amicus curiae briefs filed for the petitioner and respondent for every case 
that was granted review. This information was not available for cases that were denied 
certiorari. Public opinion was measured using data extended from Stimson’s (1999) Public 
Policy Mood measure.  
Data for the ideological direction of the median justice for each term was collected 
using the Martin-Quinn Scores of Justice Ideology (Martin and Quinn 2002). This analysis 
provides the ideological value of the median justice on the Court for a specific term and 
allows for a changing ideology throughout terms. The Martin-Quinn Scores place each 
justice on an ideological continuum and provide data for the median justice in each term, 
along with that justice’s ideological score using data based on voting patterns of each justice. 
Similarly, the ideological score for the median member of the United States Senate and the 
United States House of Representatives, as well as the ideological score of the president can 
be recorded using the Common Space Scores of the 75th – 110th Congresses. These scores are 
assigned on a scale of liberal to conservative based on voting patterns of each house of 
Congress (Poole 2009; Epstein et al 2007).  
Results 
In 499 cases, there were 6,485 recorded votes to grant or deny certiorari from thirteen 
justices serving between the years 1986 and 1993. In Table 1 there is evidence that justices 
behave strategically when engaging in both aggressive grants and defensive denials. The 
analysis complements Boucher and Segal’s (1995) findings that justices engage in aggressive 
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grants more often than defensive denials. Boucher and Segal found evidence that justices on 
the Vinson Court didn’t engage in defensive denials but did engage in aggressive grants.  
By dividing the number of votes to deny when in the minority (233) by the total 
number of votes to deny (311), Table 1 shows that justices voted to deny certiorari 75% of 
the time that they were in the minority in the decision on the merits. Similarly, by dividing 
the number of votes to grant when in the majority (405) by the number of total votes to grant 
(499), justices voted to grant certiorari 81% of the time that they were in the majority. 
Therefore, there is strong evidence to support the Defensive Denial Hypothesis and the 
Aggressive Grant Hypothesis. However, the support is stronger for justices engaging in 
aggressive grants than in defensive denials. This implies that justices are more likely to vote 
to grant cert in a case that they want to overturn versus voting to deny cert in a case in which 
their desired outcome may not be achieved. Justices are not worried about hearing a case in 
which their desired outcome may not be achieved. They are more concerned with pursuing 
cases in which they know they are in the majority and that the majority will vote similarly to 
them on the decision on the merits. 
 A logistic regression with standard errors centered by justice shows support for the 
idea that justices respond to the Senate and to the president, and strong support for the 
position that the Court responds to lower court decisions and to the United States as a party. 
As seen in Table 2, a significant negative coefficient for the median member of the Senate 
shows that a justice is less likely to vote to grant certiorari in a case where the median 
member of the Senate agrees with the lower court decision. This indicates justices are 
responsive to the Senate when considering the outcome of a case. The same holds true for the 
president. When a justice is considering granting or denying certiorari, the significant 
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negative coefficient proves that a justice is less likely to vote to grant certiorari if it is 
perceived that the president agrees with the lower court decision.  Therefore, the Senate 
Hypothesis and the President Hypothesis can be accepted. This implies that justices are more 
responsive to the Senate and the president than they are to the House of Representatives.  
This is expected because because members of the Senate and the president serve 
longer terms than members of the House of Representatives. Additionally, justices may be 
more responsive to the president and the Senate because the president nominates each justice 
and the Senate confirms the nomination. This causes the justice to perceive a duty to vote 
similarly to these offices. The justices are less likely to be responsive to the wishes of the 
House because members of the House do not play a significant role in the nomination 
process and members of House serve shorter terms than either senators or presidents. It also 
implies that a case with a lower court decision with which the Senate or president agrees has 
a lesser chance of being reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
 The strong positive coefficient for lower court congruence provides evidence for a 
reversal bias and presence of the error-correction strategy. When a justice is ideologically 
divergent from the lower court decision, there is a very strong likelihood that he will vote to 
grant certiorari in that case. This is shown by the strong positive coefficient for lower court 
divergence in Table 2. These factors lead to the acceptance of the Reversal Bias Hypothesis.  
Similarly, when the United States is the petitioner in a case, a justice is very likely to 
vote to grant cert. The lack of statistical significance proves that the same does not hold true 
when the United States is the respondent to a case. When considering all cases that were on 
the discuss list, there is a strong correlation between a vote to grant certiorari and the United 
States being present as the petitioner. Based on this, it is appropriate to accept the United 
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States as a Party Hypothesis, with the caveat that it is only true when the U.S. is the 
petitioner. This strengthens the implications that the United States petitions the Court to 
review cases that are important to political or social issues. The lack of a strong correlation 
between the United States as a respondent and votes to grant cert probably stem from the 
increased access of federal prisoners to the Court through IFP petitions. Under the Warren 
Court (1953-1969), prisoners were granted increased access to the courts with decisions like 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). 
Vort (1986) mentions that a majority of IFP petitions filed by prisoners present frivolous 
cases. A large number of IFP petitions are filed by federal prisoners, so the respondent will 
be the United States. Knowing most IFP petitions are frivolous, justices can dispose quickly 
of many cases in which the United States is the respondent. 
Table 3 shows factors influencing cert only in granted cases. A strong negative 
coefficient for lower court congruence in Table 3 shows further evidence that cases in which 
a justice disagrees with the lower court decision are more likely to be granted.  
 A justice needs only three other justices to agree with him for a case to be heard. 
However, a justice must have four other votes to achieve his desired outcome in the decision 
on the merits. The prediction and majority strategies suggest that a justice will be more likely 
to grant certiorari if they will be in the majority in the decision on the merits (Krol and 
Brenner 1989). This is proven along with the theory that justices are more likely to vote in a 
similar fashion as the ideologically median justice. With a very significant negative 
coefficient, Table 3 shows a correlation between the likelihood of a vote to grant cert and the 
justice’s ideological distance from the median justice, leading to the acceptance of the 
Median Justice Hypothesis.  
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 Examining cases that were granted allows more variables to be added to the analysis. 
Amicus curiae information is only available for granted cases. Additionally, a justice’s 
position in the decision on the merits allows an analysis of the relationship of that justice to 
the median justice that couldn’t be measured by neglecting granted cases. 
Conclusion 
 Rhode and Spaeth (1976) found that only 10-15% of cases seeking review by 
the highest court in the United States were actually granted certiorari. Shubert (1958) was the 
first academic to study strategic behavior at the certiorari stage of a case. Many scholars have 
since expanded the research on strategic cert behavior (e.g. Caldeira et al 1999; Epstein and 
Knight 1998; Brenner and Krol 1989). However, these scholars have only been able to 
examine the 10-15% of cases that the Court reviews each year. This leaves a significant gap 
in the study of strategic behavior in this stage. The previous research also fails to consider 
individual justice behavior by examining only the Court as a whole. 
I propose that studying the individual justices’ votes in the cert stage for both granted 
cases and denied cases will provide a clear picture on the strategic behavior of the Court at 
the certiorari stage. I believe that justices behave strategically and consider both institutional 
and external factors when deciding how to vote in the certiorari stage. A logistic regression 
of a sample of 499 cases from the 1986-1993 terms that were placed on the discuss list shows 
that justices do behave strategically in many cases.  
There is clear evidence from this sample that justices behave strategically by 
engaging in both defensive denials and aggressive grants. As with Boucher and Segal (1995), 
I find Supreme Court justices engage in aggressive grants more often than defensive denials. 
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I also find justices respond to the wishes of members of the Senate and the President. They 
do not, however, pay particular attention to the wishes of the House of Representatives.  
Boucher and Segal (1995) also worked from a presumption of a reversal bias, and an 
analysis of my sample shows justices are more likely to vote to grant cert when they disagree 
with the lower court decision. Petitions for certiorari are also more likely to garner a vote to 
grant review when the United States is the petitioner. No evidence is found, however, to 
show that a case is more likely to be granted when the U.S. is the respondent. There is also 
no evidence to show that Supreme Court justices respond to public mood when voting to 
grant or deny certiorari.  
In an effort to promote collegiality on the Court, justices are responsive to the 
ideology of the median justice on the Court. It is clear that justices are strategic actors and 
strategic behavior is especially important in the certiorari stage. This research is important in 
showing that justices do not engage strictly in sincere behavior and that there are both 
institutional and external factors important to a justice when he or she is deciding to grant or 
deny certiorari. 
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Table 1 
Justices Engaging in Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials, 1986-1993 
Cert Vote Vote to Deny When 
in Minority 
Vote to Grant When 
in Majority 
Total 
Deny 233 78 311 
Grant 94 405 499 
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Table 2 
Factors Influencing Cert Decision for all Cases, 1986-1993 
 Coefficient (Std, Error) p-value 
Lower Court 
Divergence 
4.43** (0.33) 0.00 
Public Opinion 0.02 (0.02) 0.15 
Median Member of 
the Senate 
-12.9** (7.13) 0.04 
Presidential Ideology -0.65** (0.35) 0.03 
Median Member of 
House 
19.4o* (14.67) 0.10 
United States as the 
Petitioner 
0.91** (0.25) 0.00 




0.02 (0.11) 0.43 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; standard errors clustered by justice; all tests one-tailed 
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Table 3 
Factors Influencing Cert Decision for Granted Cases, 1986-1993 
 Coefficient (Std. Error) p-value 
Lower Court 
Congruence 
-3.41** (1.64) 0.02 
Public Opinion -0.001 (0.06) 0.49 
Median Member of 
the Senate 
13.72 (23.08) 0.23 
Presidential Ideology -3.88 (4.25) 0.18 
Median member of 
House 
-55.58 (45.65) 0.11 
Amicus Briefs (total) 0.01 (0.03) 0.39 
United States as 
Petitioner 
1.28** (0.27) 0.00 
United States as 
Respondent 





-0.10** (0.03) 0.00 
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Appendix A 
“Rule 10. Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certiorari 
A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A 
petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only when there are special and 
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully 
measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be 
considered: 
(a) When a United States court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict 
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same 
matter; or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with a state 
court of last resort; or has so far departed form the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings, or sanction such a departure by a lower 
court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s power of supervision. 
(b) When a state court of last resort has decided a federal question in a way 
that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a 
United States court of appeals. 
(c) When a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an 
important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by this Court, or has decided a federal question in a way that 
conflicts with applicable decisions of this Court. 
The same general considerations outlined above will control in respect to a petition 
for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the United States Court of Military 
Appeals.  
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A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of 
erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” 
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Appendix B 
Parties to cases coded as representing the U.S. Government as a whole 
Attorney General of the United States 
House of Representatives 
U.S. Senate 
United States 
U.S. Air Force 
Department of Agriculture 
U.S. Army 
Civil Aeronautics Board 
Commodity Futures Trading Board 
Department of Commerce 
Comptroller of Currency 
Consumer Product Safety 
Civil Rights Commission 
Civil Service Commission 
Departments of Defense, Energy, Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, Treasury, 
and Education 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission  
Environmental Protection Agency 
Federal Aviation Agency 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Federal Communications Commission 
Food and Drug Administration 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Federal Energy Administration 
Federal Election Commission 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
Federal Housing Administration 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
Federal Labor Relations Authority 
Federal Maritime Board and Commission 
Federal Power Commission 
Federal Reserve System 
Federal Trade Commission 
Comptroller General 
Health and Human Services 
Immigration and Naturalization Services 
Internal Revenue Service 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
United States Navy 
Offices of Management and Budget, Price Administration, Personnel Management, and 
Workers Compensation   
U.S. Public Health Service 
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Securities and Exchange Commission 
Social Security Administration 
Selective Service System 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
U.S. Forest Service 
Postal Service 
Veterans’ Administration 
Transportation Security Administration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
